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Lawrence Scheinman*

The Relevance of Nuclear Proliferation
to Future European Security

The question of European security did not arise with the Cold War, and
its cessation does not end the security problematique for the continent.
Nuclear proliferation is a potential problem in two areas: the European
core, and the periphery or outside-region. The European core is comprised of reunified Germany, Eastern Europe, and any newly independent states that might emerge from a breakup of the Soviet Union. The
periphery concerns, primarily but not exclusively, the Middle East and
North Africa.1
The end of the Cold War conjures up images of a Europe reminiscent of the early part of this century: a unified, strong Germany in the
geopolitical center of the continent; multipolarity; and the presence of
potentially destabilizing nationalistic and ethnic rivalries. 2 Once again
there is a unified German state in the heart of Europe; and once again
national and ethnic rivalries have emerged which could lead to violence
in the Soviet Union and its former empire in Eastern Europe. These
rivalries cause uncertainty regarding the ultimate integrity of the Soviet
Union and raise the question whether centrifugal forces may lead to its
balkanization and result in regional destabilization.
*

Prof. of Gov't, Cornell Univ.; Advisory Comm. on Nuclear Nonproliferation &

Int'l Nuclear Cooperation, Atlantic Council of the U.S.; Special Experts Comm., U.S.
Dept. of Energy; Advisory Comm. for Oceans, Int'l Environment & Scientific Affairs,
U.S. Dept. of State. I would like to thank Peter Clausen, Jim Goldgeier, Ned Lebow,
Joseph Nye, and Leonard Spector for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. On these themes generally see, Fischer, Eastern Europe after Pax Sovietica, 46
THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 23 (1990); Muller, Western Europe Needs
Treaty, in THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, supra, at 28; Kapur, Dump the
Treaty, in THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIETISTS, supra, at 21. For a recent review
of Third World proliferation risks, see L. SPECTOR & J. SMITH, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS:
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1989-1990 (1990) and THE ASPEN STRATEGY
GROUP, NEW THREATS: RESPONDING TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL,
AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1990) [hereinafter NEW THREATS].

2. This argument is made forcefully, if not persuasively, by Mearsheimer, Back to
the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, 15 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 5 (1990).
For counterarguments, see id. at the Correspondence section of the Journal vol. 15,
no.2 and no.3.
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Appearances, however, can be deceiving. The end of the Cold War
does not mean a throwback to 1914 or 1919 as some would argue. Fundamental differences distinguish 1991 from the early twentieth century.
The ferment on the continent, whether of ethnic, national or territorial
origin, appears less virulent and destabilizing than it was at the beginning of the century. This observation counsels against overplaying the
comparisons that might be made between the disintegration of the
Soviet Empire and the earlier collapse of the Hapsburg Empire.
Forty-six years of the nuclear age have made strong inroads on
beliefs in the plausibility of military solutions to national differences on
the continent. The United States is firmly engaged in Europe and its
presence is institutionalized in NATO, which has both political relevance and military significance. Western Europe not only is organized
around NATO, but also, and perhaps more importantly, around the
European Community (EC). Germany is firmly embedded in the European Community, which in some respects represents the substitution of
collective for individual sovereignty. 3 NATO and the EC are thus factors of stability on the European continent for which there were no
counterparts seventy years ago. Also, a new dynamic now exists-the
thirty-four member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) forum aimed at bridging the divisions of Europe and fostering
reconciliation. CSCE has been at work for some time now and some
look to it as the core of a new European security system. 4 On the basis
of these considerations it is not axiomatic that the past is prologue.
I. Proliferation in the Core: Germany
The postulates of structural realism lead to the pessimistic conclusion
that the spread of nuclear weapons is only a matter of time. 5 Structural
realism posits a state-centric system characterized by anarchy and competition for power and influence. In this view, finding a systemic equilibrium or balancing power is the main task of diplomacy. Systemic
architecture is a determining factor of state behavior. The bipolar structure of the past four decades, reflected in two opposing blocs, each
3. There are some differences between the two eras that might be noted. For

example, a significant difference between 1914 and 1991 is that no matter what happens in the Balkans today, or in the Soviet Union, no major power will feel as
threatened by instability as Germany felt by Serbia's threat to Austria-Hungary in
1914. Unlike the latter era, there are today no opposing alliances of equal powers,
and instability in Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union is not a direct threat to the existence
of other major regional powers. Discussion of some of these matters, especially
regarding NATO is to be found in REFORGING EUROPEAN SECURITY: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION (K. Gottfried & P. Bracken eds. 1990). See also Joffe, The
Security Implications of a United Germany: Paper1, 257 ADELPHI PAPERS 84 (1990-91); and
Blackwill, The Security Implicationsof a United Germany: PaperII, in 257 ADELPHI PAPERS,
supra, at 92.
4. See J. GOODBY, CSCE: THE DIPLOMACY OF EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE: OCCASIONAL PAPER (The Atlantic Council of the United States) (July 1990); and Muller, A
United Nations of Europe and North America, 21 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 3 (1991).
5. See Mearsheimer, supra note 2.
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dominated by a superpower providing security through extended
nuclear deterrence in which the participants had confidence, removed
the incentive for states in the core to acquire nuclear weapons. 6 Structural realists see bipolarity as a casualty of the end of the Cold War,
replaced by reemerging multipolarity, changing perceptions of security,
and an inevitable reversion to the old law of the balance. In a world in
which nuclear deterrence, even as a last resort, remains part of the strategy of existing nuclear weapons states, others are bound to see nuclear
weapons as a logical and essential component of their security. Hence,
the realistic argue, nuclear weapons will proliferate in states capable of
deploying the necessary resources, such as Germany.
For reasons mentioned earlier-a changed environment, an American presence, institutionalization-the realist's scenario is not an inevitable one. In addition, the two former German states have a long and
consistent record of renouncing nuclear weapons. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) never had any pretensions to nuclear status. For
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), renunciation has been a centerpiece of policy since at least 1954 when, in the context of the establishment of the Western European Union, it made its first formal pledge
of nuclear abstention. Both Germanys also joined the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty ("NPT"). 7 In a joint statement issued at the 1990 NPT
Review Conference the two German states renounced production and
ownership of nuclear weapons by a future unified German state and
called for continuation of the NPT beyond 1995.8 This non-nuclear
pledge was given a legally binding character in the Treaty of Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in which the Germans once more reaffirmed their renunciation of the "manufacture and possession of, and
6. The classic statement of this view is K. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
PoLrrxcs (1979). In fairness, it should be noted that realists are not of one mind on
whether bipolarity or nuclear weapons account for post-war stability, and some, such
as Kenneth Waltz, who began with the former explanation, have subsequently concluded that it was the latter that offered the better explanation. The text characterization of realism relates more to those who argue the bipolarity case than those who
argue the nuclear weapons case, but seeks to take both into account.
7. The FRG renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons in acceding to the
Paris Agreement of 1954 creating the Western European Union. It also signed the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969, ratifying it in 1975. The
GDR signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1969. Delays in FRG ratification had to
do primarily with achievement of a satisfactory safeguards agreement between the
IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community, of which the FRG was a member. The FRG, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands all ratified on the
same day, May 2, 1975. Speculative discussions of German proliferation can be
found in Goldberg, Germany and the Emerging Balance of Power, THE WASH. Q. 157
(Winter 1990), and Woehrel, A Reunited Germany andEurope's Future, CONG. REF. REv.

15 (Mar.-Apr. 1990).
8. The statement appears in ajoint letter, dated 23 August 1990, from the Deputy Head of Delegation, Federal Republic of Germany, and the Deputy Head of Delegation, German Democratic Republic, to the Secretary-General of the Fourth Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It appears in U.N. Document NPT/CONF.IV/28 of the 1990 NPT Review
Conference.
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control over, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons." Finally, there
is an absence of any significant interest in nuclear weapons by any relevant segment of the German political spectrum. Germany today would
seem to have many of the attributes of a modem trading state. While all
of this points toward continued nonproliferation in German policy, it
bears emphasis that the United States and Soviet Union face the important challenge of assuring that Germany (and Japan) remain convinced
that international standing and influence can be predicated on economic
and technological foundations and do not require possession of nuclear
weapons.
H.

Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe is currently a region in turmoil. Democracy has been
introduced but practical experience is very limited. Economic conditions and prospects are depressing. In several of the countries ethnic
and national rivalry has reemerged as between Czechs and Slovaks;
between Hungary and Romania; and within Yugoslavia. The Warsaw
Treaty Organization has been terminated. One could postulate scenamight lead to security dilemmas involving
rios in which these1conditions
0
nuclear weaponry.
The prospect of nuclear proliferation in the region, however, seems
even more remote than in the case of Germany. The nuclear infrastructures in these countries are far less developed than that of Germany, and
it would be some time before any of them could mount a serious nuclear
weapons program. Nuclear reactors in most East European states were
provided by the Soviet Union on a "turn-key" basis. Only Czechoslovakia, among the East European states, has any significant indigenous production capability. This situation provides time for a security structure
to be put in place that would obviate the need for nuclear weapons.
Additionally, all are currently parties to the NPT. Therefore, they are
legally and politically committed not to proliferate, and all of their
nuclear activities are subject to monitoring by international verification
safeguards.
On the other hand, the nuclear programs of these states will no
longer be under the close scrutiny of the Soviet Union, which was always
a comfort to the nonproliferation community. The Soviet policy of
repatriating all discharged nuclear fuel has apparently come to an end,
resulting in the likelihood that increased quantities of nuclear fuel containing plutonium will be present on the territories of these states.
Under certain conditions this could become a temptation to develop
nuclear programs. However, the two most serious proliferation
problems for Eastern Europe at present are, first, the effect of instability
9. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Regard to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990,
United States, FRG, GDR, France, USSR, United Kingdom, art. 3.1, 29 1NT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1186 (Summer 1990).
10. See Fischer, supra note 1.
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in that region on German perceptions of security, and second, the emergence of East European countries as conduits for sensitive nuclear items
and technologies to states outside the region. This will be discussed in
the context of proliferation in the periphery.

HI. Soviet Union
Many view the breakup of the Soviet Union as the most plausible of the
scenarios for nuclear proliferation in the European core. 11 If the Soviet
Union were to disintegrate and a number of independent countries were
to emerge, two risks would arise. One is that some of those states might
have instant access to nuclear weapons that were deployed in their territory-weapons that could not be or had not been repatriated by Soviet
central authority. The other is that at least three states-Byelorussia,
Ukraine, and Lithuania-have nuclear facilities on their territory but are
not parties to the NPT and therefore are not part of the international
regime to foreclose nuclear proliferation. One could visualize their
withholding participation until their newly gained independence was
legitimated by recognition from the Soviet Union. Additionally, these
facilities are not currently under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards, although Soviet authorities have indicated their
intention to extend the Soviet voluntary safeguards offer to the IAEA to
cover all nuclear power reactors in the Soviet Union.
In conclusion of this section, I agree with the conventional wisdom
that containing nuclear proliferation greatly depends on the establishment of a new European security structure that accommodates the ferment on the continent and provides security assurance. The worst
possible situation would be the emergence of a power vacuum. For now
and the foreseeable future, two key institutional ingredients in European
security will be NATO, in some revised form, and the European Community, together with a collective reaching-out to facilitate economic
growth and development in Eastern Europe and the consolidation of the
new democracies. Both remain highly relevant to European security,
and while NATO may eventually metamorphose, for the present it has
an irreplaceable political purpose even while its military role diminishes.
While this brief review of the risk of proliferation in the European core
has ended on an optimistic note, it would be imprudent to leave the
question of potential proliferation without acknowledging the risk of the
unexpected, as demonstrated by the extraordinary events that have
taken place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the past year and
a half.
11. See, e.g., Soviet Warheads Moved from Ethnic Sore Spots, Wash. Post, Sept. 28,
1990, at Al; Gorbachev Acts to Retain Control of NuclearArms, id. at A25. See also Lees,
Renegade Russians Grab for Military Control, BULL. ATOMIC SCIETISTS 15 (Jan.-Feb.
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Proliferation in the Periphery

The principal targets of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which came into
force in 1970, were the industrialized states with a capability to produce
nuclear weapons if they were politically motivated to do so, primarily
Germany and Japan.12 For the past fifteen years, however, it has been
Third World countries which have been the concern of the Treaty and
the regime that it anchors. 1 3 Since the purpose here is to discuss European security, I will only note that Third World proliferation still represents the most serious near-term proliferation threat to the world and
that proliferation in the southern tier-especially in the Middle East and
Mediterranean-poses security problems for Europe. In one sense,
proliferation anywhere presents a security problem everywhere.
Regions are defined for analytic convenience, but political dynamics
often do not respect those divisions. Events in the Korean peninsula
will affect South Asia, and events there will affect the Near and Middle
East. Reactive policies there will impinge directly on European security
interests.
The direct effect of Middle East politics on European security is
demonstrated by the repercussions of Middle East conflicts on life in
European cities, where terrorism, hostage taking, and assassination
became at times almost commonplace. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism coupled with the growth and sophistication of weapons arsenals in
the Middle East, in some cases leading to the capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction by ballistic missile on European targets, only
confirms the relevance of the region to European security. Long standing interests of European states in various Middle East countries could
lead to European involvement in national controversies which might
invite national or terrorist retaliation.
Nuclear proliferation, especially in an era when access to ballistic
missiles and other delivery capabilities has grown, is of paraticular
importance.1 4 While most Middle East and Mediterranean countries are
parties to the NPT, Israel and Algeria are not. In addition, as recent
events related to Iraq reveal, even NPT parties may seek to evade their
obligations by covert means.t 5
12. See generally Willrich, The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear
Technology Confronts World Politics, 77 YALE LJ. 1447 (1968); M. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION,
G. QUESTER, NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY 253-57, 285-90 (1970).

1959-1979 (1980); and

13. For a discussion of Third World Proliferation, see L. SPECTOR, GOING
NUCLEAR:

THE SPREAD

OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

1986-87 (1987); L.

SPECTOR

& J.

SMITH, supra note 1; and L. DUNN, CONTROLLING THE BOMB: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

IN THE 1980s (1982).
14. Ballistic missile spread is discussed in Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,
THE WASHINGTON PAPERS 146 (1990); and NEW THREATS, supra note I.
15. Details of efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capabilities are described in The
Trail ofSecrets, The Sunday Times (London), Dec. 12, 1990, at 4, col. 1. For an assessment of those efforts, see Albright & Hibbs, Iraq and the Bomb: Were They Even Close?,
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 16 (Mar. 1991); and Albright & Hibbs, Hyping the Iraqi
Bomb, id. at 26. For an evaluation of international safeguards in Iraq, see Scheinman,
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There have always been two aspects to the nuclear proliferation
problem: motivation and capability.1 6 Motivation relates primarily to
political and security interests. It is notable that all of the key states that
have chosen not to join the NPT and not to foreswear acquisition of
nuclear weapons are driven either by the absence of security commitments or by lack of confidence in such commitments as have been made
to them by powerful states (Israel, Pakistan, India to an extent, and
South Africa) or by political considerations related to status and prestige
(India, Argentina, Brazil). Political motivations are more difficult to deal
with because they are more subjective. Security motivations are more
tangible even if not necessarily easier to address to the satisfaction of the
concerned state. Motivation is still the primary responsibility of the
superpowers, who can make the strongest impact by working to ameliorate regional controversy and facilitate stabilization through their own
regional policies and a combination of positive and negative security
guarantees. Europe can also play an increasingly important role in the
area of motivation through diplomacy or through economic and technological assistance.
Capability is another matter. This is an area where European states
have a major responsibility and a major opportunity as well as a logical
interest, given their vulnerability to violence caused by affairs in the
Middle East.1 7 States such as Germany, France, Belgium, and Italy are
major suppliers of the components, materials, and technologies relevant
to building a nuclear capability. All of them are parties to the NPT and
must therefore require that any nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon
states be subject to receiving-state commitments to peaceful use only, as
well as to international safeguards verifying fulfillment of those commitments. But only a few of the European countries insist, as a condition of
supply, that the recipient be a party to the NPT or equivalent instrument, or that they accept safeguards on all of their nuclear activities, not
just those activities based on European supplies.18
Nuclear Nonproliferationand IAEA Safeguards: The InternationalSystem and the Experience in
Iraq, II ATLANTIc COUNCIL BULL. (Feb. 1991).
16. NON-PROLIFERATION: THE WHY AND THE WHEREFORE (J. Goldblat ed. 1985);
Scheinman, Strategiesfor ProliferationManagement: Retrospect and Prospect, in STRATEGIES
FOR MANAGING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION (D. Brito, M. Intriligator & A. Wicks eds.

1983).
17. Capabilities and nuclear trade with particular emphasis on the problems
posed by emerging suppliers is thoroughly discussed in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
TRADE AND NONPROLIFERATION (W. Potter ed. 1990). See also R.JONES, C. MERLINI, J.

& W. POTTER, THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND NONPROLIFERATION (1985).
18. All NPT parties undertake to require safeguards on their nuclear exports to
any non-nuclear weapon state whether or not the latter is party to the treaty. Since
non-weapon state parties accept safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear activities,
there is no question about the scope of the applied safeguards-they are "fullscope." In the case of exports to non-NPT states, however, differences have arisen
over whether the obligation to require "the safeguards required by this article" (A.
111.1) means "full-scope" safeguards or safeguards only on the exported items. The
predominant view has been the latter, narrower, interpretation that suppliers only
PILAT
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Beyond the policy of full-scope safeguards lies the problem
revealed by Pakistani and Iraqi efforts covertly to acquire components
and parts for use in clandestine nuclear weapons programs.' 9 Their
success in this effort has revealed serious weaknesses in the export control policies of virtually all supplier states, but some more than others,
namely, Germany and Switzerland.
These problems will be compounded in Europe, especially after
1992 when the Common Market is completed and goods will flow freely
throughout the community. The weakest link in the community export
control chain will determine the effectiveness of export controls as a
whole. For example, it will do little good for the Netherlands to have
exemplary export control laws if goods can be shipped to Greece, and
from there to unreliable recipients, either because of incomplete or
inadequate Greek export provisions or because of laxity in implementation of those rules and procedures.
A major step forward was taken last year when the German government decided to restrict their nuclear exports to states that submit to
full-scope safeguards and to renegotiate, over time, existing agreements
to reflect that policy. 20 Significantly, within a month the two countries
most affected by the German decision, Argentina and Brazil, transmitted
a joint statement to the NPT Review Conference 2 confirming their
commitment to the principle of nonproliferation as set forth in a 1965
United Nations General Assembly Resolution calling for a nonproliferation treaty. They also stated their respect for the letter and spirit of the
Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of
Tlatelolco), an instrument regarded as essentially equivalent to the
22
NPT.
A further step was taken in November 1990, when the Presidents of
Brazil and Argentina signed a declaration reconfirming their determination to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency. 23 While Latin America has generally been regarded as
the least volatile of the regions prone to a nuclear arms race, Argentina
and Brazil have been considered important hold-out states. Their
movement fully to implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco, at least partly in
response to pressures emanating from the export policy of their principal supplier, Germany, is widely regarded as an important step toward
need require safeguards on what they provide. However, the number of suppliers
requiring "full-scope" safeguards as a condition for any supply is growing.
15

19. See The Trail of Secrets, supra note 15.
20. See German Move to Full-Scope SafeguardsPutting Heat on Other Supplier Countries,
NUCLEAR

FUEL 1, (Sept. 3, 1990); Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies,

Non-ProliferationTreaty, ARMS CONTROL REPORTER, § 602B.179 (1990).
21. They were observers, not participants, in the NPT Review Conference.

22. Simpson, NPT Ends Without Final Document,

NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L

16

(Dec. 1990). For the official statement consult NPT/CONF.IV/36 (1990).
23. Argentina and BrazilRenounce Atomic Weapons, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at Al,
col. 3; Brazil and Argentina Ban the Bomb, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1990, at A26.
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consolidating the overall nonproliferation regime. This strongly suggests the possibility of Europe influencing others as well.
The nuclear supply problem does not stop at the doorstep of Western Europe. In 1990, in reaction to the transformation occurring in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls ("COCOM") decided to ease curbs on technology
exports to that region of the world.2 4 The intervening crisis in the Persian Gulf, which revealed an extensive and sophisticated high-tech Iraqi
war machine, provisioned largely by industries from West Germany,
Great Britain, and even to some extent the United States, caused U.S.
reassessment of the liberalization of technology exports. The U.S.
introduced, in early March 1991, far-reaching controls on the chemical,
biological, nuclear and electronics fields, and deferred a COCOM meeting that was to have addressed the scope of export restriction relief.2 5
Although aimed at Third World regions and countries of concern, U.S.
efforts since the Iraqi War to control technology exports highlight the
problem of free-flow of technology to Eastern Europe, namely the problem of reexport, and of the limited experience and expertise in these
states in the field of export controls. In short, Eastern Europe could, for
reasons of inadequacy of control mechanisms, or due to a desire to
export in the name of economic opportunity, effectively undermine
efforts to curtail the spread of dangerous technologies, components,
and materials to high risk states and regions. This problem is intensified
by the fact that both Iraq and Pakistan used sophisticated means of
deception effectively to get around much better developed export control systems in the industrial states in pursuing their clandestine
programs.
Verification safeguards are a central element of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 26 Although it is widely understood that it is political will and self-interest, not international safeguards, that are the first
and most important line of defense against proliferation, it is also understood that without safeguards, international nuclear transactions would
come to a virtual standstill. Without safeguards, suspicion about
national nuclear programs and intentions would intensify, and nuclear
arms races could well break out if only because of the dynamics of the
security dilemma in which states would find themselves. Safeguards provide transparency, a window on the nuclear activities of states that submit their programs to international verification. As such, they are
confidence-building measures that reduce concerns about the legitimacy
24. The COCOM decision to relax restrictions, taken at the June, 1990, meeting
of the Executive Committee is discussed in COMM. ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND
PUBLIC SAFETY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FINDING COMMON GROUND:
EXPORT CONTROLS IN A CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, at 126 (1991).

U.S.

25. U.S. Balks at Easing Technology Export Curbs, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1991, at D2.
For background, see War with Iraq Spurs New Export Controls, 251 SCIENCE 512 (1991).
26. For a comprehensive discussion of safeguards and nonproliferation, see L.
SCHEINMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND WORLD NUCLEAR
ORDER (1987).
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of nuclear activities. This dissipates the urge of other states to hedge
their bets by establishing capabilities that could provide rapid transition
to nuclear weapons or even to practice a deliberate policy of nuclear
ambiguity, either of which could have destabilizing effects.
European non-nuclear weapon states, which are subject to these
safeguards as a result of joining the NPT, have always felt that safeguards are needed more for others than for themselves and from the
beginning have sought to limit the scope of inspection authority allocated to the verifying agency. 2 7 Since international organizations are
poorly situated to discriminate among their membership, the same rules
and procedures must be applied to "good" guys and others. These limitations have raised questions about the effectiveness and therefore the
credibility of international safeguards. 28 It would seem to be in
Europe's interest to reassess their attitude and to consider taking a leadership role in seeking a liberal construction of verification, and even an
extension of traditional inspection rights, in the interest of strengthening the credibility of the safeguards system, even though it means submitting to a potentially more rigorous system. Proliferation elsewhere is
not in the European interest, and steps that can be taken to build confidence in the verification system and thereby reduce proliferation risks
would seem to be logical corollaries of Europe's efforts to bring about
security and stability.
In summary, in so far as extra-regional proliferation is concerned,
three efforts would seem to be in order. First, the concerned states must
make a determined effort to pursue coordinated policies to foreclose the
transfer of technologies, material, or equipment that could contribute to
the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deliver
them on distant targets. This entails not only an agreed, robust export
control policy but substantial national regulations entailing significant
penalties for corporations or individuals who violate the rules. Second,
European states must use active diplomacy aimed at deflecting would-be
proliferators and ameliorating situations that give rise to proliferation
incentives in the first place. In addition, European states must consider
sustained diplomatic efforts to induce hold-out threshold states, with
whom European states may have closer rapport or better leverage than
the superpowers, to join the nonproliferation regime. Finally, all states
must support a robust international safeguards system with even
broader capabilities than available today and resources commensurate
with expectations about what the verification system should provide in
building confidence and contributing to security.

27. See the discussion in D.

FISCHER &

P. SZASZ,

SAFEGUARDING TuE ATOM

(1985).

28. See, for example, Latent and Blatant Proliferation:Does the NPT Work Against
Either? (Paper presented by Paul Leventhal to the Conference on Non-Proliferation in
a Disarming World, Groupe de Bellerive, in Geneva, Switzerland (June 20, 1990)).

